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“I Know He Knows I Know He Knows I Am”: Suspension of Disbelief in 
A. L. Kennedy
Ortwin de Graef
KU Leuven
and this too is one of the guises of love.
Iris Murdoch, Under the Net1
Only art now — our bodies, brushstroke, pigment, motif;
our story, figment, suspension of disbelief; 
the thrum of our blood, percussion;
chords, minor, for the music of our grief.
 Carol Ann Duffy, “Art”2 
Glasgow 1993. A new housemate turns out not to be the Martin whom 
Jennifer Wilson and her fellow-tenants were expecting. Not Martin, he 
is not quite Martian either — though he does wonder what planet he has 
landed on, and he glows in the dark. An uncertain intimacy develops 
between Jennifer and the not-Martin, and as his initial amnesia gradually 
recedes, his improbable identity emerges. 
“Tell me who you are, then. Really.”
“Savinien de Cyrano which is the truth. I promise you. I swear on 
everything I no longer have that my name is my only possession. I am 
neither mad nor mistaken, I am only impossible. Men who tell lies will 
always say impossible things, but all men who say impossible things need 
not be liars. I would maintain this rule remains unaltered when we con-
sider being impossible.”
“All right, whatever. I’ll suspend my disbelief.”
“Oh, that’s good. You have a fine way with phrases. That’s very pretty. 
Original?”
“Yes, I just made it up on the spur of the moment. The suspension of 
disbelief. Nice one.”
I know he knows I’m lying.
“Truly?”
He knows I know he knows I’m lying.
Partial answers 12/2: 355–374 © 2014 Johns Hopkins University Press
1 Murdoch 268. 
2 Duffy 60.
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“Mm hm.”
I know he knows I know he knows I am. Lying is good like this, it be-
comes a truth that only the parties included can understand and nothing to 
do with deception. (Kennedy 76)
We know she knows we know she is — but we also know another truth 
unknown to the early modern French master of swords and words im-
plausibly transported to late-ish modern Scotland in A. L. Kennedy’s 
1995 novel So I Am Glad: the real origin of the phrase in the vast body of 
writing enveloping a sacred monster of middle modern English letters, 
Coleridge’s “Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” a tale about “persons and 
characters supernatural, or at least romantic,” composed, as Coleridge 
recollects in the Biographia Literaria, with a view “to transfer from our 
inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to 
procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of dis-
belief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith” (II: 6). Kennedy’s 
character Jennifer can credibly quote the phrase without that knowledge 
— but Kennedy’s novel cannot if we do not let it. And there are too many 
reasons not to. As Coleridge indicates, the willing suspension of disbe-
lief is quite literally a matter of make-belief, and what Kennedy’s novel 
inherits from Coleridge is indeed a concern with the production of belief, 
more specifically belief in the humans we imagine ourselves and others 
to be in this other-than-Earth we call world. Both in the “Rime” and in So 
I Am Glad, the supernatural is a foiling figure for the other-than-natural 
mark of the human: the suspension of disbelief ultimately involves not 
the status of improbably resurrected bodies, be they zombie sailors or a 
French libertine returned from the dead, but rather the fully embodied 
fictions that human beings willingly, lovingly, live by. 
Consider the idiot question no reading of the “Rime” can ever ful-
ly resolve: Why kill the albatross in the first place? Most of the tenta-
tive answers to that question read the bird as a symbol for something or 
someone else (Christ and Coleridge’s soon-to-be-estranged wife Sara are 
favorites); less imaginatively, I suggest that the Mariner kills the bird 
because it is a bird.3 Recall the scene: a storm blasts the ship southward 
3 For a survey of the poem’s hyperinterpretability, see Perkins 425: “Coleridge’s ‘An-
cient Mariner’ has by now achieved the classic status of omnisignificance, like Hamlet. De-
pending on the interpreter, it expresses Coleridge’s personal life or psychoanalytic case, his 
poetic theories, religious beliefs, pantheist metaphysics, biblical hermeneutics, belatedness 
in literary history, or feelings about Western maritime expansion, about slavery, or about 
politics generally. The albatross is nature, Coleridge himself, Sarah Coleridge, a human 
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to the inhospitable extremes of the Antarctic, the ice all round cracks 
and growls and roars and howls, ironically underscoring both the utter 
absence of life off the ship and the lack of communication on board; then 
the albatross breaks through the fog and something like living commu-
nication is restored: “As if it had been a Christian soul, / We hailed it in 
God’s name” (ll. 65-66). The crew feed the bird and from then on “every 
day, for food or play, / [it] Came to the mariners’ hollo!” (ll. 73–74). 
Something has shifted: the protagonist is no longer one with the “we” 
that initially hailed the bird — they, “the mariners,” continue their play-
acting; he, the Mariner, puts an end to that nonsense because, or as if, 
the recognition of the bird as a soul casts doubt on any other living thing 
being anything other than in-animate life — soulless zombie life. If a 
bird can seem a Christian soul, then humans may just as easily be mere 
animals — no different from the “slimy things [that] crawl with legs / 
Upon the slimy sea” (ll. 125–26). With Stanley Cavell (45–65), I take 
the Mariner’s position to be one of radical skepticism: disbelief in the 
world and the human as worthy of anything like love. As we suspend 
our disbelief in the ensuing weirdness on board and around the ship, we 
witness the lifting of the Mariner’s more radical disbelief as he watches 
the water-snakes: “A spring of love gushed from my heart / And I blessed 
them unaware” (ll. 284–85). Crucially, the suspension of the Mariner’s 
disbelief in lovability occurs as a blessing “unaware” that bespeaks the 
arch-performative power of prayer — call it poetic faith, constitutively 
oblivious of its having been made up: “He prayeth well, who loveth well 
/ Both man and bird and beast” (ll. 612–13).
The suspension of disbelief, the emergence of love, and the power of 
the performative are part of what is at stake in the genre-struggles inform-
ing the literature of modernity. Coleridge’s “Rime” is arguably the mad 
ballad it is because it seeks to balance a resistance to the rise of the novel 
as a vehicle of modern love (the Ancient Mariner must spoil the wedding 
party) with the powerful evasion of the erotic which Words worth, fellow 
architect of the Lyrical Ballads, calmly imposes on poetry but which 
Coleridge can only manage — and thus fails to achieve — in the mode 
of hyperbolic demonization — “The Nightmare Life-in-Death was she, 
/ Who thicks man’s blood with cold,” ll. 193–94). Love of nature lead-
ing to love of mankind, as Wordsworth would have it (268), leaves love 
being, Christ, the Divine immanent in nature, or fresh meat as an anti-scorbutic. The world of 
the poem is providential, existential, morally incoherent, or dreamily irrelevant” (425). My 
thanks to Zoe Beenstock for bringing this article to my attention.
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for woman, or man, let alone for the world, in limbo. If Words worth’s 
ultimately theotropic anerotic ideology makes love eminently available 
as a figure for a general and critically unproblematic kindly disposition 
towards nature and the humankind that it contains, for Coleridge love 
constitutes a precarious promise, both energized and compromised by 
the intense desire of the human as the animal that desperately must, but 
at best barely manages to, relate — (to) itself, (to) others, (to) the world 
next to nature it produces as its problem. Coleridge’s crises and Words-
worth’s composure throughout their respective careers can partly be ac-
counted for in terms of the fit, or lack of it, between their distinct logics 
of love and the laws of the genres they practiced. The complex textual 
constellation of the Odes on Immortality and Dejection is a case in point, 
involving as it does Coleridge’s abject compliance with Wordsworth’s 
command to write his illicit love for Sara Hutchinson, sister of Words-
worth’s bride-to-be, out of his Ode.4 The ultimate result is the construc-
tion of a faceless “Lady” (l. 47), a “simple spirit” (l. 137) mindlessly 
receiving a “Joy” (l. 67) that she cannot think and that her self-censoring 
would-be lover cannot feel since, significantly, his “shaping spirit of 
Imagination” has been “[s]uspend[ed]” (ll. 85–86).5 
The tension between suspended imagination and suspended disbelief 
that marks the (non-)experience of love in Coleridge’s writing can also 
be said to characterize the very engagement with love as a challenge 
in modern times more generally. Before I return to explore how So I 
Am Glad inherits that challenge, I want to briefly consider an ambitious 
historico-sociological account of the reconfiguration of intimacy in mo-
dernity, which helps to highlight the critical thrust of Kennedy’s make-
belief love-making.
***
In his dense study on the codification of intimacy, Liebe als Passion, 
Niklas Luhmann specifies the general predicament of love in the modern 
condition in terms of a critical combination of disenchantment, individu-
alization, increasing impersonal relations, intensified personal relations, 
and wholesale underdetermination, opening a perspective on love as “not 
a mere anomaly, but indeed a quite normal improbability” (1986: 9).6 
4 See Ruoff for a tour of the relevant record. 
5 Quotations are from the 1817 version of “Dejection.”
6 I owe much of my understanding of Luhmann, and of Liebe als Passion in particular, 
to the staff seminars devoted to the book conducted by my friend and colleague the late 
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That love should be an improbability in the first place is due to the ex-
panded complexity of society as it morphs from a hierarchically strati-
fied and segmented system, where all individuals in principle know their 
place, into the ever-shifting constellation of functionally differentiated 
systems in which individuals are required to invent their multiple places. 
Shared understanding about the state of things between individuals in 
modern society is no longer a given, so communication, and with it love 
as a medium of communication, becomes less probable. 
As a result of destratification and desegmentation, modern individu-
als become relatively underdetermined subjects whose identity in diverse 
increasingly differentiated social (or impersonal) and personal networks 
is constantly in flux, no longer firmly codified in terms of birth, region, 
religion, caste, gender, or even species (137). Individuals are obliber-
ated: they are obliged to be free and simultaneously charged with the task 
of determining themselves in terms that must nonetheless make sense 
to the society from which, as individuals, they have been released — or 
even expelled. Like most other challenges of modernity, this is a tall or-
der involving risk-taking on the basis of expectations in a context whose 
increasing complexity and contingency makes expectation itself near-
dysfunctional. For Luhmann, modern society is essentially a set of self-
generating systems that stabilize expectations against the odds by means 
of symbolically generalized media of communication such as politics, 
science, economics, law — codes that allow individuals to share or claim 
power, truth, money and justice. None of these four instances (politics, 
science, economics, law) properly involve individuals as singular agents: 
they only enable communication on power, truth, money, and justice be-
tween anybody and anybody. But anybody also has a body, and the thing 
that has that body is a soul and that site of singularity, too, must be re-
presented. Love kicks in.
Love, for Luhmann, is not a feeling (20) but precisely the symboli-
cally generalized medium of communication that codifies the ways in 
which individuals as singular bodies and singular souls can feel what we 
call love not just for but, more importantly, with an other and, even more 
importantly, feel this in a way that makes sense to the social environment 
that surrounds them, even as that same environment has relegated them 
as individuals to a realm of intimacy beyond the reach of society. While 
Koen Geldof in 1999. For the present summary account of Love as Passion, I have benefited 
greatly from Stephen Schecter’s 2011 review essay. More generally, Cary Wolfe (see 2010) 
continues inspiring work to win Luhmann the attention of anglophone cultural scholarship 
he deserves but rarely gets. 
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the circulation of power, truth, money, and justice is, in principle, open 
to impersonal societal inspection, the circulation of love is, in principle, 
a private affair which is nonetheless assumed to follow routines that sta-
bilize it as an experience that all subjects should eventually be able to 
suffer and enjoy. In love, lovers communicate their individuality to each 
other and themselves in private terms that modern society is strategically 
indifferent to but (in as much as it requires subjects to be self-determined 
agents or psychic systems) ultimately dependent on. One of the public 
forms of managing this dependency is the novel, a tool to teach love as a 
code to increase the plausibility of the implausible: that each individual 
can successfully say “I love you,” achieve “interhuman interpenetra-
tion”7 and perhaps make it last. 
As a sociologist, Luhmann is primarily interested in the ways in which 
social systems maintain themselves. As far as the circulation of ideation-
al or semantic codes is concerned, he describes what he observes, just as 
a biologist would describe the circulation of bio-code, with this proviso 
that for the ideologist, the matter to be observed is observation itself: not 
ideas per se, which then would solicit a kind of judgment in terms of a 
dominant distinction such as just/unjust, true/false, personal/impersonal, 
plaisir/amour — that is the business of the (individual as) ideologue — 
but the media communicating and thereby observing these distinctions. 
This implies an acknowledged bias in favor of mainstream observation 
at the expense of the exceptional: in his study of the transformations 
of the love-code in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century discourse, he 
focuses explicitly on “second- and third-rate” writing confirming rather 
than questioning code (1986: 11); as he moves into the nineteenth and the 
twentieth centuries, secondary data-mining sources take over, but these 
too tend to avoid the implicit literary canon of first-rate writing — which 
may do things differently, without thereby invalidating the sociologist’s 
observations.8 In fact, as Luhmann’s love story comes closer to the time 
of its composition (late 1960s to early 1980s), there is not only a marked 
increase in the number of alternative perspectives on modern love that he 
articulates but also a more pronounced sense of uncertainty. This almost 
7 The original German has zwischenmenschliche Interpenetration (1998: 14); the trans-
lation has “interpersonal interpenetration” (1986: 13). 
8 A similar point involves the relation between the novel and poetry. Luhmann has little 
to say on love poetry as an alternative tool for self-articulation, arguably because it may ap-
pear less worried about the improbability of love and seems to respond to the indifference of 
society as an enabling condition rather than a double bind. The fact that some of the greatest 
love poetry resists that impression does not necessarily make it less plausible.
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anxious ethos of caution is not only admirably true to the unavailability 
of a manageable corpus of first-order observations to submit to second-
order observation (instances of love code in the second half of the twen-
tieth century multiply at rates which only retrospect can hope to control 
back into pattern); it also remains open to the challenge of a writing 
that sociology may never digest, even as it leaves that writing unread. 
The two closing chapters are especially remarkable in this regard. The 
penultimate chapter, tellingly titled “What Now? Problems and Alterna-
tives,” tests a few hypotheses about the semantics of love at the time of 
writing and comes to rest in a slightly wistful reflection upon the dif-
ference between then and now. When love started becoming an issue as 
dominant social stratification started to give, society was not yet strongly 
impersonalized and individuals could still be led to learn, through litera-
ture, “to become totally involved in an other of their choice and to live 
in and through that other” (1986: 171), leaving the semantics of love to 
legitimate that choice for an alternative personal investment.9 “Today,” 
the general impersonalization of society requires no such legitimation 
for “the construction of a purely personal world,” since society has just 
about abandoned any claims on the space for the personal anyway. Yet, 
and this is the conclusion, it is probably only now that individuals ex-
perience how improbable such a construction really is. The final chap-
ter, “Love as a System of Interpenetration,” first takes a deep breath to 
recover from this sobering suggestion by summarizing the book “from 
the point of view of systems theory” (1986: 172), only to return to the 
thought that the personal world of interpenetrating lovers can never be 
firmly founded, but this time ending on a strange string of verse: 
Therefore, it is not possible to say everything. Transparency only exists in 
the relationship of system and system, and by virtue, so to speak, of the 
difference of system and environment, which constitutes the system in the 
first place. Love and love alone can be such transparency:
 A face in front of 
 one
 neither now any more sub-ject
 only reference
 intangible 
 and fixed. 
   (Friedrich Rudolf Hohl) (1986: 177–78)10
9 I have slightly modified the translation to recover Luhmann’s insistence on alterity: 
“einen ausgewählten anderen” (1998: 215) rather than the “person” in the English translation.
10 Drucilla Cornell draws our attention to this poem as an indication of what she calls 
Luhmann’s “dream of love” (86).
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The bracketed name of the author of the previously unpublished lines 
closes the book: Friedrich Rudolf Hohl, a close friend of Luhmann’s to 
whose memory the book is dedicated, further modulating the elegiac un-
decidabilities in its closing lines. 
While the strange face at the end of Love as Passion requires a read-
ing in its own right, it also recalls the importance of reading to mod-
ern love as such, both in the sense that lovers must somehow read each 
other to construct their intimacy and in the sense that instructions for 
this operation require reading as well. But neither kind of reading can be 
taken for granted, though that is exactly what is needed for the reading to 
function, as instruction, as construction. Accompanying and interrupting 
these functionings, there is always something underway which may still 
be called deconstruction and which is attended to by writing that resists 
codification even as it affirms the world as the promise of the code. 
***
In So I Am Glad that deconstruction is at least double: the novel revisits 
the possibility conditions for the construction of intimacy by insisting, 
trivially but crucially, on feeling as embodied experience; yet it resists 
the privatization or domestication accompanying the modern codifica-
tion of love. The first exploration involves the somatic singularity of the 
construction of intimacy that is necessarily but problematically bracketed 
in an account of love as a symbolically generalized medium of commu-
nication; the second entertains the public reinscription of the suspension 
of disbelief in love as an impassioned performance of careful feeling for 
an other-than-purely-personal world.
For all its focus on the improbability of love and its deep engage-
ment with the paradoxes and ineffabilities that the codification of inti-
macy comes up against, Luhmann’s analysis rests on the assumption that 
while individuals may not yet be initiated in the code of love, they are 
in principle ready to be taught to feel it, even to the limit when it breaks 
down, but then in a workable awareness of what it is, exactly, that breaks 
down — access to the inner experience of the other. From Luhmann’s so-
ciological perspective, explicitly informed as it is by information theory 
and cybernetics, humans tend to appear as so many processors uniformly 
hardwired to plug into the system, run a social code, and balance input 
with output. Communication breakdown is interesting only insofar as it 
involves the system, not the performance of any one theoretically indif-
ferent individual. Yet while individuals must to some extent indeed be 
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theoretically interchangeable as so many standard humans for systems 
sociology to do its work, love does seem to raise a special challenge. 
Inasmuch as love indeed occurs as the quite normal improbability of 
“interhuman interpenetration” in a “purely personal world,” bracketing 
personal differences may be more problematic, especially when these 
differences are not just contingent idiosyncracies but other-than-normal-
ities that question the norm of the human as the animal in principle fit for 
love-code processing and the experience of feeling.11 
Kennedy’s protagonist Jennifer Wilson embodies that question. Her 
“principal characteristic” is a disposition she calls “calmness” but also 
recognizes as “an invincible lack of involvement,” “in fact, empty space 
— or, to be more exact, a pause” (4): “When something happens to me, 
I don’t know how to feel” (4–5). Most people “have whole hordes of 
feeling all barrelling round inside them like tireless moles”; as children, 
“[t]hey will pack a room to the ceiling with riotous, tunnelling mammals 
for no special reason at all. They have moles and they will exercise them, 
simply because they are there” (ibid.). “I have read,” Jennifer writes, that 
as they grow up “these innocent mole containers go out in the world and 
learn to conserve their moles”:
They are taught that other people’s livestock may be unpleasant and do 
their little charges harm. A room full of moles can be messy and trouble-
some, even painful. The world is full of sharp little edges and nasty cor-
ners and such factors must encourage a level of reasonable restraint to 
protect both the moles and their minders.
This means that adults can behave quite calmly and safely with barely 
a trace of their animal insides showing from day to day. Equally, it only 
takes a first morning of perfect snow, a rapid descent into love or divorce, 
an especially manipulative film and the moles are out and rolling all over 
the carpet. So even if we can’t see them, we take it for granted that every-
one has moles. (5–6)
Rewriting what she has read about humans and their feelings as this vivid 
vignette of blind furry animals tunneling away through human space, in 
the opening pages of her story Jennifer makes us reread what we take for 
granted and then gives us herself to read:
11 The suggestion that love as a medium of communication in Luhmann’s systems theory 
is somehow a special case — so special even that it challenges the theory’s cardinal insis-
tence that society does not consist of people and thereby affects its foundational disctinction 
between social systems and psychic systems — requires more unpacking than is conceiv-
able, or desirable, here. 
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As I write this, I can see extremely clearly that nothing terribly bad has 
ever happened to me. I can’t recall a single moment of damage that could 
have turned me out to be who I am today. I can dig down as deep as there 
is to dig inside me and there truly is nothing there. Not a squeak. For no 
good reason, no reason at all, I am empty. I don’t have any moles. (6–7)
“Sometimes, the best beginning is a lie” (280), she writes on the final 
page of her book, and having read the love story it narrates, we know 
we had to believe this lie, suspending our disbelief, for the thought ex-
periment that Kennedy performs to work — to grant us an experience 
of the unreadability of the other not as a pious trope but as a fact that 
we must preserve even as we learn to disbelieve it.12 Stripped down to 
basics, the thought experiment involves increasing the improbability of 
love by manipulating the standard love parameters. Instead of making up 
all too human beings equipped with default neurotypical wetware and 
located close enough to each other in space and time to meet and con-
struct love’s “purely personal world” of “interhuman interpenetration,” 
Kennedy stages a match between a constitutionally unemotional and 
invincibly uninvolved late twentieth-century woman and a long-dead 
seventeenth-century French erudite libertine swashbuckler dropped from 
the darkness into an upstairs bedroom. Although the text does not men-
tion autism or spectrum disorder,13 Jennifer is imaginatively manipulated 
to express ASD traits in a voice exploring what it means not to be able 
to access the inner life of others.14 For that exploration to compel, the 
12 The line I will pursue here is that the relevant lie is “I don’t have any moles” (i.e. 
emotions), rather than “nothing terribly bad has ever happened to me” — which, unless 
all of Jennifer’s story is a lie, or unless you want to quibble about what does or does not 
qualify as “terrible” or “happening to,” is a lie too. Both lies may be related, but Kennedy 
is too good at fiction to fall for facile constructions of causality. The relation between the 
unnerving physical and psychological violence in So I Am Glad and its exploration of love 
remains unread here. For a more sustained exploration of Kennedy’s ethics of lying, see 
Stirling. David Borthwick correctly identifies Kennedy’s disruption of “narrative linearity” 
as a means to establish “the realist authenticity of Jennifer’s emotional disposition” before 
exposing the reader to the supernatural weirdness of her story “without seriously upsetting 
the novel’s verisimilitude” (265); yet the novel’s real challenge in terms of verisimilitude 
involves not so much the credibility of its streaks of fantasy as it does the very notion of 
“emotional integrity.” 
13 Autism as a term has been around for about a century now, but has only fairly recently 
become the everyday word it still is, though the term “autism spectrum disorder” (ASD, 
coined in the late 1980s) or just “spectrum disorder” is beginning to replace it. For an excel-
lent succinct account of autism in contemporary culture, see Hacking. 
14 “I stopped trying to be normal and began to enjoy a small, still life that fitted very snug-
ly around nobody but me. . . . I once believed I had an overly practical nature and that my 
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voice has to be articulate, so Jennifer is tacitly nudged towards the high-
functioning side of the spectrum and given a job doing voices for radio: 
“I place something invisible in the air, just so, give it a tangible shape and 
somewhere, someone, a stranger, will get a word and the feeling in that 
word — both of them at once and because of me. I can do that” (38). As 
a soul that cannot feel yet is possessed of a voice that can project feeling 
across time and space, Jennifer is a liminal being living the undecid-
able difference between artifice bereft of authenticity and the truth about 
language as the soul’s tool to touch itself and other souls into being and 
loving. Neurotypical wetware obscures this truth by unreflectively natu-
ralizing the technology of the trace that enables humans to imagine each 
other. If, as much contemporary neuroscience excited by mirror neurons 
suggests, neurotypical humans at a basic level indeed do experience the 
emotions and behavior of others without linguistic mediation, through a 
“mechanism of embodied simulation,” it does not follow that the com-
plex intentional dispositions involved in reading the other as a loved soul 
— an intense form of what neuroscientists call “brain-to-brain coupling” 
— can be adequately accounted for without recourse to the symbolic 
transmission technology of language.15 Yet to the extent that the touch of 
the other transmitted through symbolic traces releases somatic responses 
similar to those activated in unmediated embodied simulation, it is tempt-
ing to short-circuit mediation altogether and to conflate human emotional 
practices with the neural mechanisms they generate. Popular neurosci-
ence today tends to foster this further and thereby installs a “high-tech 
phrenology” 16 regime of neuro-ideological self-evidence badly in need 
of interruption. 
Jennifer’s fanciful vision of emotional life as mole frenzy at once sup-
plies and suspends such interruption. She may not know, but Kennedy’s 
lack of romantic enthusiasm stemmed from that, but now I know I have simply been unable 
to share in the emotional payoff, to feel the benefits of close company and sex. I’m not good 
at emotional payoffs. I am not emotional” (4). Yet she also notes, “This is one thing I can say 
in my favour — if I have no idea of your mental state, I will ask you for more information. 
Many people base a lifetime’s personal relations solely on guess-work” (31).
15 For an excellent and accessible account of the “mechanism of embodied simulation,” 
see Gallese. As one of the neuroscientists who first discovered and described the operations 
of mirror neurons, Vittorio Gallese is inspiringly skeptical about facile extrapolations of his 
findings to more comprehensive accounts of human comportment. For the notion of “brain-
to-brain coupling,” see Hasson et al.
16 “[H]igh-tech phrenology” is Gallese’s dismissive phrase for attempts “to locate in the 
brain the module through which you can theorize about the mind of others, as if intentions, 
beliefs, and desires were objects located in a brain box” (14).
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text does, and enjoins us to read what it knows. For Jennifer’s imagina-
tion of average inner life as a mole menagerie is critically reminiscent of 
Cyrano de Bergerac’s “mitology,” the theory of “cironalité universelle” 
(94) (“universal mitedom”) expounded in his L’Autre Monde ou les États 
et Empires de la Lune, first published in a posthumous expurgated ver-
sion in 1657, later better known as Voyage dans la lune or Voyage to the 
Moon.17 Cyrano’s “mitology” suggests that the human animal amounts 
to a colony of smaller animals, but it initially remains undecided on the 
locus of agency:
Perhaps our Flesh, Blood, and Spirits, are nothing else but a Contexture 
of little Animals that correspond, lend us Motion from theirs, and blindly 
suffer themselves to be guided by our Will, which is their Coachman; or 
otherwise conduct us, and all Conspiring together, produce that Action 
which we call Life. (1899: 165)
Later, however, the animals take control when “the Soul,” in the blink of 
an intercalated premise, is defined as “the Action of these little Beasts” 
(168). The point here, in Kennedy’s revisitation of this vision, is not that 
the soul would somehow be degraded in this incipient radically material-
ist reading of human being — it is not, it only becomes more properly 
the object of what Nietzsche presciently envisaged as a proper science of 
the soul as the “social structure of the instincts and the passions” (§12)18 
— but rather that it raises the question as to what kind of soul humans 
whose internal menagerie is empty can be said to have. If the emotional 
life of average human beings is a matter of moles scurrying around, what 
of those beings who, like Jennifer, “don’t have any moles” — and, im-
17 Unless otherwise noted, quotations from Cyrano are from the late-nineteenth-century 
edition of the 1687 English translation by Archibald Lovell (1899). For a helpful fairly recent 
account of Cyrano’s “savoir fiction,” see Romanowski. “Universal mitedom” is Romanows-
ki’s translation of Cyrano’s “cironalité universelle”; Lovell’s translation has “universal Ver-
micularity” (168), a neologism (unrecognised by the OED) based on the translation of the 
French “ciron” (mite) as “Hand-worm” (165), the name of one particularly nasty mite.
18 This is probably the best place to acknowledge that my mumbling on the soul here and 
elsewhere requires clearer articulation, and I thank Naomi Rokotnitz and Tom Toremans for 
their expressions of frustration on this point. For now, I would just clarify that I take on board 
Nietzsche’s denunciation (in §12 of Beyond Good and Evil) of Christian (or any other theo-
tropic) “soul-atomism,” but critically embrace his insistence that this need not spell a getting 
rid of “the soul,” which happens when we abandon it to what he calls the “naturalists.” To 
be continued — in a conversation with neuropsychology and cognitive science that does not 
dismiss a thought like this: the soul is the body that delivers itself as symbol and remains as 
symbol when the flesh fades.
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portantly, were born without them?19 For “moles” read “molecules,” or 
more precisely those molecules making up DNA macromolecules in the 
genome such that certain neural pathways involved in emotion process-
ing are impacted — or less precisely any of the biological bits building 
“modules” that distinguish neurotypicals from humans with the kind of 
mindblindness that comes with spectrum disorder.20 The precise scientif-
ic detail of the mole-model Jennifer inherits from Cyrano does not much 
matter here; what matters is its animal materialism, and that only matters 
inasmuch as it is supplemented with an alternative, other-than-animal 
materialism. 
For overruling her atypical wetware, language rewires Jennifer for 
love and she suffers a massive mole invasion.
The first indication of the emergence of affect between Jennifer and 
Savinien is appropriately triggered by the materiality of voice: “Some-
thing in his tone of voice set up a cold little splash of nervous reaction 
tight under my heart, but I didn’t think about it” (53). Jennifer signifi-
cantly interrupts her reconstruction of the ensuing conversation, in which 
Cyrano begins to reveal his identity, with an admission of defeat under-
scoring the upsurge of feeling: “If I could, I would write his voice so that 
you could feel it the way I did, dark and simple. Also good, very pleasant 
to hear — except for the chill of confusion under it that left him speaking 
from somewhere I couldn’t touch” (56). The scene ends with Cyrano’s 
first full self-articulation — “I was Savinien de Cyrano de Bergerac and 
I was true” (59), leaving Jennifer with, she writes, “an unfamiliar tight-
ness keeping snug under my scarf. I blew my nose. It didn’t help” (60). 
The love story that starts to unfold here is the faltering construction of a 
relation between somatic experience and the reality of the other “some-
where” you cannot touch — though the point is precisely to touch there. 
Such is the theory of the point Savinien teaches Jennifer. He asks her to 
say his name: “Only the first one. Sa-vi-nien. It’s like if you eat some-
thing and it tastes good and then better, best at the very end. Sa-vi-nien. 
You look at me in my eyes and say that. Please” (77). Jennifer complies, 
and saying his name makes what Savinien calls “a point”: “When a point 
has been made you will feel it like nothing else and any explanation is 
no longer to the point — it is beside the point. Which is a beginning of 
getting an impression of the true point” (77–78).
19 Jennifer takes pains to spell out that her moles are not just sleepy or in hiding but that 
“almost the first thing” she noticed about herself was that she “had a certain moley some-
thing missing” (6).
20 For the classic account of mindblindness, see Baron-Cohen.
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“The point is that single moment when you truly touch another person. 
You reach to them with a word, a thought, a gesture, an attack from the 
third position that flicks to the fourth and slips through, hits its mark. And 
within the point which is a very brief thing (not enough time for your heart 
to beat) two human beings are one. The speaker and the listener, the writer 
and the reader, the man who bleeds and the man who makes him, they are 
the same thing. You, when you say my name — there — that’s a point.”
“I don’t think I would like that.”
“You wouldn’t like what?
I can feel the beginning of a nervous cough, but I swallow it down. 
“Points, they sound uncomfortable.”
“They are alive. Don’t you like to be alive. Ah no, I forgot, you are 
mostly oblivious.” His hands flutter their fingers together and he peers. 
“Alive, this isn’t attractive, just in some corner of Jennifer. Touched by 
life.” (78) 
The analogy between dialogue and dueling underscores the somatic im-
pact of the linguistic point as well as the potential for trauma that any 
true trace of touch carries.21 It also indicates that truly touching involves 
practice, not just predisposition — that the achievement of the improb-
able is a matter of exposure to code. As Jennifer finally imagines herself 
writing: “I don’t have to say who I am writing this to — we already know. 
We are we, Écuyer de Cyrano. We are we. I am more than myself now 
when I never asked to be because I am still you and I. I can remember 
how to be that. The bare words are I love you” (203). After which she 
finally succumbs to the “mystifying necessity” of kissing (208).
By delicately entertaining the materialist miracle that suspends innate 
mindblindness through the language of love and realizes itself in im-
possible passion, the novel increases love’s unlikelihood only to affirm 
its possibility as the supreme fiction acknowledging the unreadable but 
overwhelmingly believable soul of the other. If love is this, what have 
the neurotypicals been feeling? Again, So I Am Glad does not mention 
autism, and as a result is not in danger of stereotyping and thus misrepre-
senting a clinical condition.22 Rather, it implicitly invokes aspects of the 
21 In a sustained reading of the novel, the potential for pain in love in this sense would 
have to be distinguished from the theatrical sado-masochism in Jennifer’s half-hearted love 
relation with Steven, which she picks up again, to horrifying effect, in the period of Sav-
inien’s absence. Connections between sadism and spectrum disorder are easier to imagine 
than to establish. 
22 For critical comments on cultural representations of autism, see Osteen 29–41 and 
Draaisma.
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clinical condition to make strange again the doubly material neurotech-
nics of mind-reading so easily taken for granted and therefore denied in 
the stereotypes of all too likely love we live by.
***
But the novel does not only reclaim the unlikelihood of love as an in-
terpenetration of souls; it also resists the domestication or privatization 
accompanying “the construction of a purely personal world” which Luh-
mann diagnoses as modern love’s labor. Resonating with Jennifer’s first 
sensation of something like love in response to a “tone” (53) in Sav-
inien’s voice, this resistance to the sidetracking of sentiment takes shape 
as a “tone” (218) invading Jennifer’s voice. Reading out romantic novels 
on to tape for the visually impaired she has to overcome the interference 
of her own emotional involvement but generally manages to do her job, 
“to be a mouth without a brain” (217). Reading out the news is another 
matter: no longer able to smoothly deliver the daily litany of ills and 
evils, she “develop[s] a tone,” an “unnecessary color in the voice, an air 
of negative comment” (218). Unnecessary to her superiors, but vital to 
her: “Someone I loved was living here and I cared about them. People 
who cared about each other were out there, beyond the studio, up to their 
necks in crap. I had to say. I couldn’t help it” (220). The lucid blind-
ness of love generates care for the world as a volitional necessity: she 
could not help helping the world by giving voice to its wrongs.23 Instead 
of feeding either sentimental self-involvement or the blithe assumption 
that personal emotional consummation in and of itself establishes justice, 
love here releases critical sentiment as the care to curse.24 Yet while Jen-
nifer’s tone bespeaks love as also always the desire to affirm the world, it 
is, as she acknowledges, “the only protest I could make,” weak and inef-
fectual, and “[w]hen the European election came by in June, I couldn’t 
even bring myself to vote” (221). The uncast vote and the inarticulate 
tone are the unvoiced echoes of the arch-performative “I love” which 
the world continues to demand and for which Cyrano, sadly, is barely 
remembered, even though that utopian performative is his true legacy 
23 For the concept of volitional necessity, see Frankfurt. Some reflections on its relation 
to love come up in de Graef.
24 Simon Baron-Cohen’s notion of empathy as a “universal solvent” (2012: 132) is a par-
ticularly uncompelling instance of the miraculous extension of personal sentiment to world 
peace. 
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— not the ghostloveletterwriting visited on him by Rostand, or indeed 
his nose — further testimony to the privatization of love as a separate 
sphere.25 
Recovering this legacy, So I Am Glad is also a labor of love, rei-
magining Cyrano against the tragicomedy-of-errors icon parading under 
his name on stage and screen. Early on in her narrative, Jennifer recalls 
an afternoon when she first “noticed Martin becoming more of himself” 
(39). The reader does not yet know who Martin really is, but in retro-
spect the ensuing scene grants him the chance to truly and triumphantly 
become “more of himself” again. Jennifer has just told him about her job 
as a broadcaster, and Martin runs with the idea, first speculating on the 
“remarkable power” (39) this technology holds, and then performing a 
sustained satirical riff for the benefit of the imaginary “gentle listener” 
(41) on the pervasive lunacy of late twentieth-century public life: 
Who will be sure, in that Babel of opinion, that infanticide and the oth-
er noble forms of slaughter are not the most virtuous forms of enterprise? 
I can foresee that we will embrace them as excellent means of saving weak 
or innocent souls from the hardships and temptations they might otherwise 
meet and succumb to in life.
But how will your government survive when this supremacy of the 
demented is fully achieved? Let me tell you, gentle listener, it will walk 
among us finally unafraid to be itself. These are the men and women who 
are paid to improve your health by removing your physicians, to educate 
your scholars by removing their books, to shelter your people by remov-
ing their homes, to guard your souls by destroying your faith, to cherish 
the truth by hiding it in petty ignorance, who imprison the blameless, free 
the guilty, nourish your poor with starvation and let loose senility, terror 
and confusion in your streets because this will be to the benefit of you all. 
We are mad to suffer them and they are, most assuredly, true paragons of 
madness, every one. (41) 
The unmistakable nod to Swift’s Modest Proposal is a matter of poetic 
justice, recording Swift’s debt to Cyrano; but equally important is Mar-
tin’s remark after his pretend performance, “Of course, I would have 
prepared what I would say. I would wish to combine a certain immediate 
fire with a smoothness in the flow of speaking” (42), which establishes a 
relation with contemporary stand-up comedy, a genre also practiced by 
A. L. Kennedy herself, and certainly one of the forms of speaking truth 
to power keeping the spirit of satire alive. And the point is indeed in the 
spirit, as witness also the destruction of faith at the centre of Savinien’s 
25 See Harvey for an engaging classic account of Cyrano as a “mad” rationalist material-
ist freethinker.
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catastrophe catalogue, which finds an echo in Jennifer’s own indictment 
of the state of things in the wake of his passing. Unable to claim the uto-
pian confidence with which Cyrano imagined this world an Other World 
of liberty, equality, and embodied pleasure for fully flourishing humans, 
Jennifer nonetheless inherits and remembers all of Savinien’s voice in 
the emptiness he leaves — “not a part of it fades” (280), and it informs 
her book with a passionate anger at the resentful nihilism of these barren 
times: “Say it loud, say it proud, this is when I finally become certain 
that only my time, the one I am used to and where I feel at home, has the 
power to make belief irrelevant, sentimental, banal” (219–20). Belief is 
what souls hold against the odds: faith in the readability of the unread-
able other, in the lovability of an unlovable world. Sentimental. Banal. 
Irrelevant. Imperative.
The recovery of Cyrano’s legacy comes at a price. Jennifer and Sav-
inien travel to Paris and visit the “writers’ mass grave” (270) that is the 
Bibliothèque Nationale to look up Cyrano’s published work. Savinien 
does not like “the edge of amusement that greet[s] any mention of his 
work” (270), and when his books finally arrive, “[e]very opened page 
sen[ds] up the harsh, cold scent of pure time” (270). The expurgations 
inflicted by his friend Henri Lebret enrage Savinien, the record of his 
friend’s memoir touches him, but the exposure to the traces of pure time 
preserved under his name recalls his death and, after a few days of lov-
ing shared denial, on the 339th anniversary of his dying day he dies again. 
The suspension of disbelief in the other and of cynical disbelief in a 
world worth loving requires faith in language as the arch-technology of 
transmission, but that technology is also the precondition of our predica-
ment as things of time and thus cannot but spell death (Derrida 375). In 
Coleridge, poetic faith fades into the death-denial of religion when the 
credibility of the world becomes a figment of the imagination as “the 
repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite 
I AM.” (1: 304). Kennedy’s counter-formula — “He knows I know he 
knows I am” — conjures up the alternative materialist infinity of linguis-
tic recursion as the technology that invents us as beings in time inheriting 
the love to curse that powers worldly prayer for more generous justice 
now.26 Jennifer’s final sentences record Savinien de Cyrano de Berger-
26 The classic case for recursion as “the only uniquely human component of the faculty 
of language” (1569) and the engine of so-called “discrete infinity” (“a finite set of elements 
. . . yields a potentially infinite array of discrete expressions”) (1571) is Hauser, Chom-
sky, and Fitch. Corballis gives an accessible account of recursion as a central component of 
theory of mind and time-consciousness.
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ac’s gift in a last lie that deceives no one yet commands belief: “So now 
there’s no one here but me and you and this. I will miss this and I will 
miss Savinien and I will be glad.” (280). Seeking to release love as also 
always care for the world, So I Am Glad realizes such release requires 
suspending the disbelief in death that bodies in love are blessed with 
against their better knowledge. Savinien de Cyrano de Bergerac dies, 
again. But he will always have made his point. 
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